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“I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your 
Funeral, My Trial”: Global Clinical Legal Education 
and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases 
Michael L. Perlin∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
If there has been any constant in modern mental disability law in 
its thirty-five-year history,1 it is the near-universal reality that counsel 
assigned to represent individuals at involuntary civil commitment 
cases is likely to be ineffective. We knew this at the dawn of the 
modern era.2 We knew it when some courts started taking more 
seriously some of the other substantive and procedural rights of 
persons who were the subjects of such hearings.3 We knew it when so 
 
∗ Professor, New York Law School; Director, International Mental Disability Law 
Reform Project; Director, Online Mental Disability Law Program, New York Law School. J.D. 
(1969), Columbia University School of Law; A.B. (1966), Rutgers University.  
 The author wishes to thank Devra Nemrow and An Truong for their excellent research 
assistance, and Peter Joy and Sue McGraugh for their incisive and helpful comments. 
 1. See generally Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that a 
statute that fails to provide a person alleged to be mentally ill with adequate procedural 
safeguards is unconstitutional); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff’d, 
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the mentally ill have a 
constitutional right to adequate treatment in a mental hospital); Michael L. Perlin, “Chimes of 
Freedom:” International Human Rights and Institutional Mental Disability Law, 21 N.Y.L. 
SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 423 (2002) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) 
(holding that a statute that effectively condemned defendant to permanent institutionalization 
deprived him of equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment)).  
 2.  See, e.g., Elliott Andalman & David L. Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons 
Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 MISS. L.J. 43, 72 (1974) 
(speculating that counsel was so inadequate in the sample study that patients’ chances for 
hospital release were enhanced if no lawyer was present); George E. Dix, Acute Psychiatric 
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in the Metropolis: An Empirical Study, 1968 WASH U. L.Q. 
485, 540 (1968) (noting that only two of 1700 contested cases resulted in patient release). 
 3. See Leslie Scallet, The Realities of Mental Health Advocacy: State ex rel. Memmel v. 
Mundy, in MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY: AN EMERGING FORCE IN CONSUMERS’ RIGHTS 79, 81 
(Louis E. Kopolow & Helene Bloom eds., 1977) (stating that the former system of 
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few states chose to follow the examples of New York,4 New Jersey,5 
and a handful of other jurisdictions that legislatively created 
regularized, dedicated, specialized legal services offices whose 
primary job was to provide representation at such hearings.6 We 
knew it when academics and practitioners began to unpack the ethical 
issues that permeated civil commitment hearings.7 We knew it when 
it became clear that only in those jurisdictions that had dedicated 
counsel programs was there any coherent body of reported civil 
commitment case law.8 And we knew it when we began to 
discover—as our attention turned, far too tardily, to international and 
comparative mental disability law9—that, in many nations, there was 
no mental disability “law,”10 and that even where there was such law, 
the promise of counsel was little more than an illusion.11 
 
representation in Milwaukee County operated as a “greedy runway to the county mental health 
center”). 
 4. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 47.01–.03 (McKinney 1996). 
 5. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27EE-20 (West 2006). 
 6. See 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§ 2B-1 
to 7.2 (2d ed. 1998). 
 7. See, e.g., James R. Elkins, Legal Representation of the Mentally Ill, 82 W. VA. L. 
REV. 157 (1979); Stanley S. Herr, The Future of Advocacy for Persons with Mental Disabilities, 
39 RUTGERS L. REV. 443 (1987); Peter Margulies, “Who Are You to Tell Me That?”: Attorney-
Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 
213 (1990); Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of 
Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (1982); Michael L. 
Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability 
Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992); Steven J. Schwartz et al., Protecting the Rights and 
Enhancing the Dignity of People with Mental Disabilities: Standards for Effective Legal 
Advocacy, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 541 (1983). 
 8. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in 
Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 708–09 (2003): 
 A contrast between the development of case law in Virginia and Minnesota is 
especially instructive. Notwithstanding the fact that Virginia’s population is 
approximately 15% greater than Minnesota’s, Virginia had only two published 
litigated civil cases on questions of mental hospitalization during the decade from 
1976 to 1986, while Minnesota had at least 101 such cases in the same period. 
Significantly, Minnesota has a tradition of providing vigorous counsel to persons with 
mental disabilities, while Virginia does not. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 9. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE 
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2006). 
 10. That is, there was not even a statute that purported to govern such cases. See, e.g., 
Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental Disability Law: 
The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 333, 337 (2007) (“A recent report by 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/9
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And so it remains today. The quality of counsel assigned to 
represent individuals who face involuntary civil commitment to 
psychiatric hospitals is, in most United States jurisdictions, mediocre 
or worse.12 Legal challenges to the status quo have been rare.13 
Perhaps startlingly, this reality goes almost unmentioned in the legal 
literature.14 Also, those of us who identify with the clinical legal 
education movement cannot pat ourselves on the back too vigorously; 
in a recent survey, I identified only ten domestic law schools that 
offered courses that, broadly, could be called “mental disability law 
clinics.”15 In other countries, there are far fewer.16 
As of the writing of this Article, in only one U.S. jurisdiction—
Montana—has a court grasped the scope of the problem.17 As I will 
discuss subsequently, this decision has had almost no discernable 
impact on the state of the law elsewhere,18 but at least gives us a 
baseline against which we can assess the enormity of the problem in 
other jurisdictions. 
 
the World Health Organization (WHO) revealed that 25% of all nations in the world have no 
mental health law.”). 
 11.  See id. at 341 (“It is rare for even minimal access to counsel to be statutorily (or 
judicially) mandated, and, even where counsel is legislatively ordered, it is rarely provided. 
Moreover, the lack of meaningful judicial review makes the commitment hearing system little 
more than a meretricious pretext.”). 
 12. See Perlin, supra note 7, at 43. See also Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My 
Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to 
Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 738 (2005) (“The data suggests that, in 
many jurisdictions, such counsel is woefully inadequate—disinterested, uninformed, roleless, 
and often hostile.”). 
 13. See 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2B-11-3, at 88–91 (2d ed. Supp. 2007) (discussing In re Mental Health 
of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001) (using an expansive interpretation of adequacy of counsel 
in civil commitment cases and noting how that decision is “the exception to the usual 
practice”)). 
 14. A Westlaw search of “(adequacy effectiveness) +3 counsel /s ‘civil commitment,’” 
reveals no articles other than those written by this author.  
 15. Perlin, supra note 8, at 712 n.170. These schools are Chicago, Lewis & Clark, New 
England, New York Law School, Richmond, Texas, Touro, Virginia, William Mitchell, and 
Yale. Id. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 35–59 (discussing K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 485). 
 18. See In re Detention of T.A. H.-L., 97 P.3d 767, 771–72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (“We 
do not share the Montana Supreme Court’s dim view of the quality of civil commitment 
proceedings, or their adversarial nature, in the state of Washington. The Strickland standard 
appears to be sufficient to protect the right to the effective assistance of counsel for a civil 
commitment respondent in this state.”). 
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Yet I am unwilling to be entirely pessimistic. Encouragingly, a 
variety of interrelated factors may shed some light on this scandal 
and lead to positive social change in this area: the new, robust case 
law from the European Court on Human Rights on virtually all 
aspects of mental disability law;19 the ratification of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities20 and 
the publication of the World Health Organization Resource Book on 
Mental Health,21 both of which will eventually attract international 
attention to this issue;22 the first burst of professional interest in this 
issue, as evidenced by programs, workshops, and panels focusing 
precisely on the extent of this dilemma at the 2007 Congress of the 
International Academy of Law and Mental Health,23 and the 2006 
conference of the Australia and New Zealand Association of 
Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law;24 the focus by mental disability 
law-specific NGOs (e.g., Mental Disability Rights International; 
Mental Disability Advocacy Center) on institutional conditions in 
Central and Eastern Europe and in Central and South America, 
calling attention to this issue;25 greater interest globally in what can 
broadly be called “access to justice” issues;26 and the emergence of 
 
 19. See, e.g., PERLIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 451–789. 
 20. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was 
adopted in December 2006 and opened for signature in March 2007. It entered into force—thus 
becoming legally binding on State parties—on May 3, 2008, thirty days after the 20th 
ratification. G.A. Res. 61/611, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/611 (Dec. 6, 2006). On the 20th 
ratification, see http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/hr4941.doc.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2008). The final version of the Convention is found at: http://www.un.org/disabilities/ 
documents/convention/convoptprot-e.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2008). 
 21. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE 
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 63–105 (2006) (reprinting excerpts from 
WHO Book). 
 22. See, e.g., Lance Gable, The Proliferation of Human Rights in Global Health 
Governance, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 534 (2007); Arlene S. Kanter, The Promise and Challenge 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. 
INT’L L. & COM. 287 (2007). 
 23. See 30th International Congress on Law and Mental Health Final Program, 
http://ialmh.org/Padua2007/Final_Program.doc (last visited Sept. 15, 2008). 
 24. See Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 
http://www.anzappl.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2008). 
 25. I discuss this extensively in Perlin, supra note 10. 
 26. See, e.g., Margaret Woo et al., Migrant Access to Civil Justice in Beijing, 4 LOYOLA 
U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 101 (2007); Gary K.Y. Chan, The Right of Access to Justice: Judicial 
Discourse in Singapore and Malaysia, 2 ASIAN J. COMPAR. L. (2007), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol2/iss1/art2/. 
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the Global Alliance for Justice Education as a factor in the promotion 
of socially relevant legal education.27 
So the question is joined: Do we have any reason to feel even a 
shred of optimism about likely future developments in this area? Are 
we doomed simply to repeat the dreary experiences of the past thirty-
five years, or are there any glimmers of hope that might lead us to 
expect that, globally, there will be some point in the future when 
lawyers who represent persons facing civil commitment will no 
longer be, in Judge David Bazelon’s memorable phrase, “walking 
violations of the Sixth Amendment”?28 And, finally, what role can 
clinical programs play in ameliorating this miserable situation?29 
In Part I of this Article, I will review developments in the United 
States, with special focus on the Montana case of In re Mental Health 
of K.G.F.,30 without doubt the most comprehensive decision on the 
scope and meaning of the right to counsel in this context from any 
jurisdiction in the world. In Part II, I will survey an array of other 
jurisdictions (common law, civil law, and mixed) and consider the 
range of findings (from nations in which there is no counsel, to 
perfunctory-at-best counsel, to almost-adequate counsel). In Part III, I 
will consider other major legal, political, and social developments 
that might, it is hoped, illuminate these issues. In Part IV, I will 
examine these issues from the perspective of clinical legal education. 
In Part V, I will consider the impact of sanism31 and pretextuality32 
on these developments. Finally, I will offer some modest conclusions.  
 
 27. See, e.g., Frank S. Bloch, Access to Justice and the Global Clinical Movement, NYLS 
Clinical Research Institute Paper No. 07/08-8 (Oct. 10, 2007) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with Social Science Research Network), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1022685; Margaret Martin Barry et al., Justice Education and the Evaluation 
Process: Crossing Borders, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 195 (2008). 
 28. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1973). 
 29. See Bloch, supra note 27, at 25 (“The global clinical movement may be the best hope 
for moving the access to justice movement along.”). 
 30. 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001). 
 31. Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational 
prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, 
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. See infra Part V. 
 32. Pretextuality defines the ways in which courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) 
testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-
making. See infra Part V. 
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My title is drawn from Bob Dylan’s 2001 song, Cry a While.33 It 
is found in these couplets: 
Well, you bet on a horse and it ran on the wrong way  
I always said you’d be sorry and today could be the day  
I might need a good lawyer, could be your funeral, my trial 
Well, I cried for you, now it’s your turn, you can cry a while.34 
For many persons with mental disabilities, the lack of a good 
lawyer turns their trial into a (legal) funeral. It is time that this 
pernicious practice be ended. 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF K.G.F.35 
As I have already noted, K.G.F. is the most important case ever 
litigated in this area. K.G.F. was a voluntary patient at a community 
hospital in Montana whose expressed desire to leave the facility 
prompted a State petition alleging her need for commitment.36 
Counsel was appointed, and a commitment hearing was scheduled for 
the next day.37 The State’s expert recommended commitment; 
patient’s counsel presented the testimony of the plaintiff herself and a 
mental health professional who recommended that the patient be kept 
in the hospital a few days so that a community-based treatment plan 
could be arranged nearer to her home.38 The court ordered 
commitment.39 K.G.F.’s appeal was premised, in part, on allegations 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.40 
In a thoughtful and scholarly opinion, the Montana Supreme 
Court relied on state statutory and constitutional sources to find that 
“the right to counsel . . . provides an individual subject to an 
involuntary commitment proceeding the right to effective assistance 
 
 33. BOB DYLAN, Cry a While, on LOVE AND THEFT (Sony BMG 2001). 
 34. Id. The line in question apparently derives from an older blues song by Sonny Boy 
Williamson. See ANDREW MUIR, TROUBADOUR: EARLY & LATE SONGS OF BOB DYLAN 284 
(2003). 
 35. This section is largely adapted from Perlin, supra note 8, at 691–94. 
 36. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 488 (Mont. 2001). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/9
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of counsel. In turn, this right affords the individual with the right to 
raise the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in challenging 
a commitment order.”41 In assessing what constitutes “effectiveness,” 
the court—startlingly, to my mind—eschewed the Strickland v. 
Washington standard42 (used to assess effectiveness in criminal cases) 
as insufficiently protective of the “liberty interests of individuals such 
as K.G.F., who may or may not have broken any law, but who, upon 
the expiration of a ninety-day commitment, must indefinitely bear the 
badge of inferiority of a once ‘involuntarily committed’ person with a 
proven mental disorder.”43 Interestingly, one of the key reasons why 
Strickland was seen as lacking was the court’s conclusion that 
“reasonable professional assistance”44—the linchpin of the Strickland 
decision—“cannot be presumed in a proceeding that routinely 
accepts—and even requires—an unreasonably low standard of legal 
assistance and generally disdains zealous, adversarial 
confrontation.”45 
In assessing the contours of effective assistance of counsel, the 
court emphasized that it was not limiting its inquiry to courtroom 
performance; even more important was counsel’s “failure to fully 
investigate and comprehend a patient’s circumstances prior to an 
involuntary civil commitment hearing or trial, which may, in turn, 
lead to critical decision-making between counsel and client as to how 
best to proceed.”46 Such pre-hearing matters, the court continued, 
“clearly involve effective preparation prior to a hearing or trial.”47 
The court further emphasized the role of state laws guaranteeing the 
patient’s “dignity and personal integrity”48 and “privacy and 
dignity”49 in its decision: “‘[q]uality counsel provides the most likely 
 
 41. Id. at 491. 
 42. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing weak effectiveness of 
counsel standard). See generally PERLIN, supra note 6, § 2B-11.2, at 261–67. 
 43. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 491. 
 44. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 45. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 492 (citing Perlin, supra note 7, at 53–54 (“identifying the 
Strickland standard as ‘sterile and perfunctory’ where ‘reasonably effective assistance’ is 
objectively measured by the ‘prevailing professional norms’”)). 
 46. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 492. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 493 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-101(1)). 
 49. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 493 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-142(1)). See also MONT. 
CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The dignity of the human being is inviolable.”). See generally Michael L. 
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way—perhaps the only likely way’ to ensure the due process 
protection of dignity and privacy interests in cases such as the one at 
bar.”50 
After similarly elaborating on counsel’s role in the client 
interview and the need to ensure that the patient understands the 
scope of the right to remain silent, the court concluded by 
underscoring counsel’s responsibilities “as an advocate and 
adversary.”51 The lawyer must “represent the perspective of the 
[patient] and . . . serve as a vigorous advocate for the [patient’s] 
wishes,”52 engaging in “all aspects of advocacy and vigorously 
argu[ing] to the best of his or her ability for the ends desired by the 
client,”53 and operating on the “presumption that a client wishes to 
not be involuntarily committed.”54 Thus, “evidence that counsel 
independently advocated or otherwise acquiesced to an involuntary 
commitment—in the absence of any evidence of a voluntary and 
knowing consent by the patient-respondent—will establish the 
presumption that counsel was ineffective.”55 In conclusion, the court 
stated: 
[I]t is not only counsel for the patient-respondent, but also 
courts, that are charged with the duty of safeguarding the due 
process rights of individuals involved at every stage of the 
proceedings, and must therefore rigorously adhere to the 
standards expressed herein, as well as those mandated under 
[state statute].56 
On one hand, K.G.F. provides an “easily transferable blueprint for 
courts that want to grapple with adequacy of counsel issues”;57 on the 
other, no other state court has adopted its reasoning in the six-plus 
years since it was decided. As indicated earlier, its rationale was 
 
Perlin, “Dignity Was the First to Leave”: Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of 
Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61 (1996). 
 50. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 494 (citing Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 7, at 47). 
 51. Id. at 500. 
 52. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 53. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 501. 
 57. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 13, § 2B-11.3, at 90. 
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rejected by the Washington Supreme Court in an opinion that 
concluded, with no supporting empirical or other statistical evidence: 
We do not share the Montana Supreme Court’s dim view of 
the quality of civil commitment proceedings, or their 
adversarial nature, in the state of Washington. The Strickland 
standard appears to be sufficient to protect the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel for a civil commitment 
respondent in this state.58 
Writing about this issue in a domestic context several years ago, I 
noted: 
[G]lobally, counsel’s continuing failure here still appears to be 
inevitable, given the bar’s abject disregard of both consumer 
groups (made up predominantly of former recipients, both 
voluntary and involuntary, of mental disability services) and 
individuals with mental disabilities, many of whom have 
written carefully, thoughtfully, and sensitively about these 
issues.59 
The question is joined: If we use K.G.F. as a benchmark, to what 
percentage of persons subject to involuntary civil commitment is 
adequate counsel provided? And if this percentage is woefully low, 
what, if anything can be done about it? 
 
 58. In re Detention of T.A. H.-L., 97 P.3d 767, 771–72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
 59. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”, supra 
note 12, at 741–42. 
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II. A GLOBAL CONSIDERATION 
Globally, there is little good news.60 In many nations, there is no 
mental health law at all.61 In others, there is simply no provision for 
counsel.62 In others, counsel appears to be present in name only, what 
is referred to disparagingly in the literature as the “warm body” 
problem.63 In only a few instances does counsel appear to be doing a 
remotely adequate job.64 Persons with mental disabilities are a 
paradigmatic example of the individuals—in Frank Bloch’s words:—
“deprived of basic rights and needs [who] are unable to benefit from 
relief that might be available through their local legal system and 
legal regime.”65 
Again, globally, the picture is dismal. On the African continent, 
South Africa is apparently the only nation that provides counsel prior 
to civil commitment.66 A recent comprehensive analysis of the law in 
 
 60. For a particularly pessimistic view of the state of affairs in the former Soviet bloc 
nations, see Oliver Lewis, Mental Disability Law in Central and Eastern Europe: Paper, 
Practice, Promise, 8 J. MENTAL HEALTH L. 293 (2002). 
 61. See generally Perlin, supra note 10, at 337–40 (listing multiple examples). 
 62. Id. at 340–42 (listing examples). 
 63. See, e.g., Pamela Metzger, Doing Katrina Time, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1175, 1198 (2007) 
(“This right to counsel is not satisfied by the mere appearance of a warm body wearing a 
business suit and holding a copy of the [statute book].”). 
 64. There has been significant litigation in Western Europe on matters involving, e.g., 
involuntary civil commitment and institutional rights, stemming largely from the promulgation 
of the Human Rights Act of 1998, that brought certain rights articulated in the European 
Convention of Human Rights into domestic law. See Jonathan Bindman et al., The Human 
Rights Act and Mental Health Legislation, 182 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 91 (2003); David Kingdon 
et al., Protecting the Human Rights of People with Mental Disorder: New Recommendations 
Emerging from the Council of Europe, 185 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 277 (2004); Perlin, supra note 
10, at 348; Kris Gledhill, Patient Representation (Nov. 10, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author); Valerie Williams, The Challenge for Australian Jurisdictions to Guarantee 
Free Qualified Representation Before Mental Health Tribunals and Boards of Review: Learning 
from the Tasmanian Experience? (Nov. 12, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). There also have been encouraging developments from Israel. See Public Defender 
Office, Representation of Mentally Ill Clients at the District Psychiatric Committees (paper 
presented at 29 Annual Congress, International Academy of Law and Mental Health, Paris, 
France, July 2005) (PowerPoint slides on file with author). But these appear to be the stark 
exceptions. 
 65. Bloch, supra note 27, at 8. 
 66. Mental Health Act of 2002 s. 15 (S. Afr.). A recent comprehensive study of access to 
justice in Africa does not reveal any other example of the existence of such a right. See ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE IN AFRICA AND BEYOND: MAKING THE RULE OF LAW A REALITY (Penal Reform 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/9
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Uganda, in fact, focuses on that legislation’s failure to provide 
counsel as one of its major “human rights gaps.”67 Although there is a 
right to counsel in India,68 research has revealed no such right in a 
range of other Asian nations including, inter alia, Afghanistan, China, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam; 
similarly, no such right appears to exist in a range of South American 
nations, including Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela.69 The only non-
U.S.-based evidence I could find in the literature, of a hospital 
administration urging the extended appointment of counsel in civil 
commitment cases, is from Israel.70 
This is troubling for many reasons, not the least of which is that, 
without the availability of such counsel, it has been “virtually 
impossible” to imagine the existence of the bodies of involuntary 
civil commitment law, right to treatment law, right to refuse 
treatment law, or any aspect of forensic mental disability law that are 
now taken for granted in the United States.71 Without the presence of 
 
Int’l & Bluhm Legal Clinic eds., National Institute for Trial Advocacy 2007) [hereinafter 
JUSTICE IN AFRICA]. 
 67. Mulumba Moses, Analysis of the Uganda Mental Treatment Act from a Human 
Rights and Public Health Perspective, at 12–13 (Aug. 13, 2007) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with the Social Science Research Network), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1006230. 
 68. India Mental Health Act § 91, 1987, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, available at 
http://www.disabilityindia.org/mentalact.cfm. 
 69. Memorandum from An Truong to Author (Aug. 27, 2007) (on file with author). 
 70. See Arie Bauer et al., Regional Psychiatric Boards in Israel: Expectations and 
Realities, 28 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 661, 668 (2005) (“[I]t seems advisable that all persons 
hospitalized compulsorily . . . be legally represented at RPB [Regional Psychiatric Board] 
hearings, in order to ensure the greatest possible protection for their rights, first and foremost 
their liberty.”). Bauer works for the Forensic Psychiatry Unit of the Mental Health Services 
Division of the Israel Ministry of Mental Health. See also Arie Bauer, Trends in Involuntary 
Psychiatric Hospitalization in Israel 1991–2000, 30 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 60, 67 (2007) 
(speculating that amendment to national mental health law providing for counsel in all RPB 
proceedings “will bring about a diminution in the number of involuntary hospitalizations”).  
 On the implications of Israel’s activist judiciary, see Eli Salzberger, Judicial Activism in 
Israel: Sources, Forms and Manifestations (May 10, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Social Science Research Network), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=984918. On the uniqueness of Israel’s “mixed” legal system, see Nir Kedar, 
Civil Codification, Law and Culture in a Mixed Legal System (Jan. 20, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Social Sciences Research Network), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=957592. 
 71. Perlin, supra note 10, at 341. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 241 Perlin book pages  10/30/08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
252 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 28:241 
 
 
counsel, legal reform—in nations with developing economies, at 
least—“will all too often be a hollow shell.”72 
III. OTHER MAJOR LEGAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
There is an important paradox here that needs to be highlighted. 
At the same time that the non-developments that I have outlined 
above have taken place, there have been many important and 
overlapping positive developments, all five of which, when 
considered together, shine new light on the underlying issues and 
promise to focus new attention on them in the near future. 
First is the first international case law that begins to articulate a 
broad right to counsel in all cases. Decisions such as Airey v. 
Ireland73 and Currie v. Jamaica74 (both concluding that a litigant’s 
right to effective access to the courts may sometimes require the state 
to provide for the assistance of a lawyer) have begun to give litigators 
the tools through which they can seek to “craft arguments supporting 
the right to counsel in civil proceedings under international law.”75 It 
is essential that advocates bring cases in international courts to 
articulate this specific right in the specific context of involuntary civil 
commitment.76  
Second are the ratification of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the publication of the 
World Health Organization Resource Book on Mental Health, both of 
which will eventually attract international attention to this issue. The 
new U.N. convention mandates that “States Parties shall take 
appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to 
 
 72. Stephen Golub, The Importance of Legal Aid in Legal Reform, in JUSTICE IN AFRICA, 
supra note 66, at xv, xviii. 
 73. 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1979). 
 74. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 377/1989, P 13.6, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/50/D/377/1989 (1994), as cited in Sarah Paoletti, Deriving Support from International 
Law for the Right to Counsel in the Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 651, 655 
n.32 (2006).  
 75. Paoletti, supra note 74, at 51. 
 76. On the question of the theoretical and constitutional underpinnings of right to counsel 
in all civil cases, see infra note 77 (citing sources). 
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the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.”77 
Elsewhere, the convention commands: 
States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for 
persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, 
including through the provision of procedural and age 
appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their 
effective role as direct and indirect participants, including as 
witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at investigative 
and other preliminary stages.78 
The extent to which this Article is honored in signatory nations 
will have a major impact on the extent to which this entire 
Convention affects persons with mental disabilities.79 
 
 77.  G.A. Res. 61/106, ¶ 12.3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006). See generally 
Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2007). For a thoughtful 
and comprehensive predecessor article, see Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting 
Through the Lens of Mental Disability: The Proposed International Convention on Protection 
and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 181 
(2005). 
 On the potential international law bases of a global right to counsel in all civil cases, see 
Paoletti, supra note 75; Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon as a Human Right: Is the U.S. Going to 
Join Step with the Rest of the Developed World, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 769 (2006); 
Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social Change, 15 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 697 (2006). In the United States, at least, civil commitment 
cases—for purposes of such matters as burden of proof—occupy a space between civil and 
criminal cases. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (finding that an intermediate 
burden of clear and convincing evidence is required, explaining why neither the traditional 
criminal nor civil burden is appropriate in such a case). Addington is discussed in this context in 
PERLIN, supra note 6, § 2C-5.1a, at 395–400. 
 78. G.A. Res. 61/106, ¶ 13.1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006). 
 79. Distinguished commentators have raised important, but still-unanswered, questions: 
To what extent will the Convention, in fact, be a “human rights convention for the 21 century”? 
See, e.g., Lisa Waddington, A New Era in Human Rights Protection in the European 
Community: The Implications [of] the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities for the European Community 4 (Sept. 27, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the Social Sciences Research Network), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1026581.  
 Will the convention be a “clear moral compass”? See, e.g., Gerard Quinn, Keynote Speech 
at the European Conference on the Integration of Persons with Disabilities: The UN Convention 
on the Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities 3 (June 10, 2007), available at 
http://www.nhri.net/2007/Berlin-Quinn.2.pdf. 
 For a discussion of the specific potential impact of Article 13, see Waddington, supra note 
79. Professor Simon Rice has argued persuasively that legal aid is a human right. See Simon 
Rice, A Human Right to Legal Aid (Macquarie Univ. Div. of Law, Working Paper No. 2007–
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The third development is the first burst of professional interest in 
this issue, as evidenced by programs, workshops and panels focusing 
precisely on the extent of this dilemma at the Congress of the 
International Academy of Law and Mental Health (“IALMH”), and 
the conference of the Australia and New Zealand Association of 
Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law (“ANZAPPL”). 
It is not insignificant that the first scholarly developments in this 
area have come in the guise of interdisciplinary conferences that 
involved lawyers and mental health professionals. The most recent 
IALMH Congress featured a program on Advocating Care—The 
Models and Roles in the Experience of Advocacy;80 I led a workshop 
at the 2006 ANZAPPL Congress on The Provision of Advocacy 
Services and the Role of Counsel in Cases of Persons with Mental 
Disabilities,81 examining the same issues explored in this Article. I 
believe that, in the coming years, there will be more and more 
interdisciplinary professional focus on these issues, and that, as a 
result of that heightened focus, the concerns raised here will be 
considered far more widely. 
Fourth is the focus by mental disability law-specific NGOs (e.g., 
Mental Disability Rights International; Mental Disability Advocacy 
Center) on institutional conditions in Central and Eastern Europe and 
in Central and South America, calling attention to this issue. Recent 
years have seen the emergence of two important NGOs, one based in 
Washington, D.C., and one based in Budapest, that have done a 
heroic job82 of calling the world’s attention to worldwide conditions 
in psychiatric institutions and to the inhuman and degrading 
treatment of persons institutionalized by reason of mental disability.83 
 
14, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1061541. It is still 
far too early to speculate as to what impact such scholarship will have on the issues addressed 
in this Article. 
 80. See Final Conference Program, International Scientific Committee, 30th International 
Congress on Law and Mental Health (June 25, 2007), available at http://www.ialmh.org/ 
Padua2007/Final_Program.doc.  
 81. See Program and Registration, Human Rights in a World of Fear and Diminishing 
Resources, Australian and New Zealand Ass’n of Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law 4 (Nov. 9, 
2006), available at http://www.anzappl.org/documents/ANZAPPL2006AnnualCongress_003. 
pdf. 
 82. See Perlin, supra note 10, at 334. 
 83. For discussions of the work done by MDRI and MDAC, see Perlin, supra note 10, at 
337; Gable, supra note 22, at 540; Kanter, supra note 22, at 316; Alex Geisinger & Michael 
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It is not an exaggeration to say that, together, these two groups have 
done more than all the “traditional” human rights offices combined to 
call the world’s attention to these issues.84 And the lack of counsel 
available to persons institutionalized because of mental disability is 
one of those issues emphasized in their reports and other 
documents.85 
The fifth development is the emergence of the Global Alliance for 
Justice Education (“GAJE”) as a factor in the promotion of socially 
relevant legal education, similarly calling attention to these issues. 
GAJE is a global alliance of “people committed to achieving justice 
through education, with a focus on clinical education and other forms 
of socially relevant legal education,”86 and on preserving and 
supporting a social justice focus for clinical legal education around 
the world,87 as a means of creating “a valuable tool in developing 
countries to help promote equal justice for the poor.”88 Seeking to 
empower “marginalized” sectors of society is one of its articulated 
aims.89 
 
Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 77, 107–09 (2007); 
Laura E. Hortas, Asylum Protection for the Mentally Disabled: How the Evolution of Rights for 
the Mentally Ill in the United States Created a “Social Group,” 20 CONN. J. INT’L L. 155, 181–
82 (2004). See generally PERLIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 803–09, 855–57, 862–63, 867–69, 
872–81. 
 84. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: 
Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael 
Dudley ed., forthcoming 2008); Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Mental 
Disability Law: The Core Issues, in PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW—POLICY AND 
PRACTICE (Lawrence Gostin ed., forthcoming 2008). 
 85. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 60, at 195–96. See also Mental Disability Rights 
International, Projects: Neuro-Psychiatric Hospital of Paraguay, http://www.mdri.org/projects/ 
americas/paraguay/index.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2008); MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS 
INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH: MEXICO (2000); MENTAL 
DISABILITY RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH URUGUAY 
(1995). 
 86. Elizabeth Cooper, Global Collaboration in Law Schools: Lessons to Learn, 30 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 346, 347 (2007). 
 87. Frank S. Bloch & M.R.K. Prasad, Institutionalizing a Social Justice Mission for 
Clinical Legal Education: Cross-National Currents from India and the United States, 13 
CLINICAL L. REV. 165, 166 n.2 (2006). 
 88. Peggy Maisel, Expanding and Sustaining Clinical Legal Education in Developing 
Countries: What We Can Learn from South Africa, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 374, 419 (2007). 
 89. See GAJE.org, 5th Worldwide Conference on the Global Alliance for Justice 
Education, http://www.gaje.org/Conf08-home.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2008). 
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Individuals with mental disabilities—people who are largely 
“voiceless” and “traditionally isolated from the majoritarian 
democratic political system”—are frequently marginalized to an even 
greater extent than are others who fit within the definition of 
“discrete and insular minorities.”90 The emergence of GAJE as an 
important force in the promotion of social justice should be yet 
another factor in focusing positive attention on this marginalization 
and the issues discussed in this Article.91  
IV. THE ROLE OF CLINICS 
There are remarkably few clinics at U.S.-based law schools that 
provide representation in civil commitment cases.92 Internationally, 
the picture is even drearier.93 Notwithstanding the significance of 
representation to the disposition of civil commitment cases,94 this is 
simply an area of representation that has captured neither the 
imagination nor the attention of clinicians at home or elsewhere. 
There is some irony here, for we are beginning to realize the 
profound impact that law school clinics can have on the entire 
enterprise of “justice education” throughout the world.95 Recent 
scholarship focuses on the “real life” impact of clinics in this context
 
 90. Perlin, supra note 8, at 687. The “discrete and insular minorities” phrase is found in 
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 91. For a discussion of the significance of human rights education in promoting the rule of 
law in nations with developing economies, see Sisay Alemahu Yeshnew, Utilising the 
Promotional Mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Promote 
Human Rights Education in Africa, 7 AFR. HUM. RTS. J. 191 (2007). 
 92. See Perlin, supra note 8, at 712 n.170 (listing clinics). 
 93. See infra text accompanying note 104. 
 94. “Empirical surveys consistently demonstrate that the quality of counsel remains the 
single most important factor in the disposition of involuntary civil commitment cases.” Michael 
L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More than “Dodging Lions and Wastin’ Time”? 
Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in Individual Right to 
Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 114, 120 (1996) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 95. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 27, at 200–09 (discussing justice education as “one 
of the primary goals of legal education”). 
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in nations as disparate as Japan,96 the Czech Republic,97 China,98 
India,99 and nations with developing economies in Central and South 
America,100 and the similar impact of U.S.-based clinics on citizens 
of nations as disparate as Jamaica, Ghana, and Poland.101 Clinical 
education should also, optimally, be able both to make students aware 
of any pre-existing sanist perspective they “bring to the table,”102 and 
to turn such students into more assertive advocates for their clients 
with mental illness (or perceived mental illness).103 Yet a recent 
survey by Professor Roy Stuckey of clinical law teachers with 
international teaching or consulting experience only appears to reveal 
one non-U.S.-based professor involved with this enterprise in mental 
disability law contexts in other nations.104 
 
 96. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy et al., Building Clinical Legal Education Programs in a 
Country Without a Tradition of Graduate Professional Legal Education: Japan Educational 
Reform as a Case Study, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 417 (2006). 
 97. See, e.g., Vendula Bryxová, Introducing Legal Clinics in Olomouc, Czech Republic, J. 
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. 149 (2006). 
 98. See, e.g., Note, Adopting and Adapting: Clinical Legal Education and Access to 
Justice in China, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2134 (2007); Mao Ling, Clinical Legal Education and the 
Reform of the Higher Legal Education System in China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 421 (2007); 
Pamela N. Phan, Clinical Legal Education in China: In Pursuit of a Culture of Law and a 
Mission of Social Justice, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 117 (2005). 
 99. See, e.g., Bloch & Prasad, supra note 87; Frank S. Bloch & Iqbal S. Ishar, Legal Aid, 
Public Service and Clinical Legal Education: Future Directions from India and the United 
States, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 92 (1990). 
 100. See, e.g., Richard J. Wilson, Training for Justice: The Global Reach of Clinical Legal 
Education, 22 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 421 (2004); Richard J. Wilson, Three Law School 
Clinics in Chile, 1970–2000: Innovation, Resistance and Conformity in the Global South, 8 
CLINICAL L. REV. 515 (2002). 
 101. For a discussion of these examples, see Teaching International Law—“The Visible 
College of International Clinicians Making a Real Difference in Law School and in the World, 
95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L LEGAL PROC. 188 (2001) (remarks by Diane Edelman).  
 102. See supra text of note 31; Perlin, supra note 8. 
 103. Perlin, supra note 8, at 685: 
The . . . phenomena [of sanist myths] are especially troubling in the clinical setting, in 
which students are exposed for the first time to the skills that go to the heart of the 
lawyering process: interviewing, investigating, counseling and negotiating. All of 
these are difficult for us (and our students) to learn, but this difficulty is significantly 
increased when the client is a person with mental disability (or one so perceived). The 
difficulties can be further exacerbated when the clinical teacher—either overtly or 
covertly—expresses sanist thoughts or reifies sanist myths.  
Id. (emphasis added). Sanism is discussed extensively infra Part V. See also supra note 31. 
 104. Roy Stuckey, Compilation of Clinical Law Teachers with International Teaching or 
Consulting Experience, manuscript at 43 (updated June 15, 2005), http://law.sc.edu/clinic/does/ 
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I believe, as I will discuss more extensively below, that this is due, 
at least in part, to the ravages of sanism,105 both active and passive. 
But this revelation is no longer new. I have written in the past how 
clinical professors are not immune from the same sanist attitudes that 
infect the rest of society,106 and it is essential that we remember this 
as we seek to implement progressive social change in this area. 
There is, to be sure, some positive light peeking through the mist. 
Several colleagues, both in the United States and abroad, have done 
inspiring work in focusing on the need for clinical programs to 
involve themselves more comprehensively in human rights education 
and in preparing their students to focus on global justice issues.107 On 
 
internationalsurvey.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2008). Professor Kate Diesfeld has spoken 
extensively about a mental health and learning disability clinic that she established at the 
University of Kent at Canterbury in the United Kingdom. See http://www.aut.ac.nz/about/ 
faculties/health_and_environmental_sciences/research_centres_and_institutes/national_centre_f
or_health_and_social_ethics/consultation_and_public_services.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 
2008). 
 105. See Perlin, supra note 8, at 713: 
Several years ago, I gave the keynote presentation at a Society of American Law 
Teachers (SALT) conference, and presented a paper titled, “Mental Disability, Sanism, 
Pretextuality, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Teaching Law.” SALT regularly 
provides speaking forums for professors whose primary scholarly (and often personal) 
interests are the rights of the “discrete and insular minorities” described in footnote 4 
of the Carolene Products case. SALT draws from the ranks of politically progressive 
law professors, including many who articulate a commitment to social justice as one of 
the reasons they joined the academy. The organization has been a consistent voice in 
the fight to insure diversity in the classroom and the curriculum. Each year, at the 
Association of American Law Professors’ annual conference, there is a SALT meeting, 
and often (if not always), some political activity “in the streets.” Yet, the response to 
my talk was strikingly at odds with this commitment to diversity and social justice. In 
an article subsequently published in the SALT Equalizer, Professor Rogelio Lasso 
wrote that he found it particularly disturbing that “Sanism” merited a plenary 
presentation but that the “disgraceful lack of racial diversity of law school faculties” 
did not.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 106. See generally Perlin, supra note 8. 
 107. See, e.g., Roy T. Stuckey, Preparing Students to Practice Law: A Global Problem in 
Need of Global Solutions, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 649 (2002); Philip Iya, Enhancing the Teaching of 
Human Rights in African Universities: What Role for Law School Clinics?, 7 INT’L J. CLINICAL 
LEGAL EDUC. 20 (2005); David McQuoid-Mason, The Supply Side: The Role of Lawyers in the 
Provision of Legal Aid—Some Lessons from South Africa, in JUSTICE IN AFRICA, supra note 66, 
at 97. Professor Louise McKinney, by way of example, is currently working in Gaborone, 
Botswana, assisting the University of Botswana Department of Law’s clinical education 
program. Posting of Louise McKinney, louise.mckinney@case.edu, to owner-
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the specific issue of mental disability law representation, two law 
schools in Japan—one with no tradition of any clinical education, and 
the other with perhaps the strongest tradition of providing such 
courses—have given me tentative oral commitments that they will 
create clinical programs to represent individuals in civil commitment 
hearings.108 In addition, Nkumba University Law School in Uganda 
has agreed to create a similar program, contingent on availability of 
funding.109 But there is no evidence that these developments will 
have an immediate effect on the global lack of clinical involvement. 
V. THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF SANISM AND 
PRETEXTUALITY 
Sanism110 permeates all aspects of mental disability law and 
affects all participants in the mental disability law system: litigants, 
fact finders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses. Its corrosive 
effects have warped mental disability law jurisprudence in 
involuntary civil commitment law, institutional law, tort law, and all 
aspects of the criminal process (pretrial, trial, and sentencing). It 
reflects what civil rights lawyer Florynce Kennedy has characterized 
as the “pathology of oppression.”111 
“Pretextuality”112 is especially poisonous where witnesses, 
especially expert witnesses, show a “high propensity to purposely 
distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.”113 This 
pretextuality infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds 
 
gaje@vanderbilt.edu on behalf of GAJE Listserv Messages (Oct. 13, 2007) (on file with 
author). 
 108. E-Mail from Yoshikazu Ikehara, Esq., Director, Tokyo Advocacy Law Office, to 
Author (Jan. 21, 2008) (on file with author) (memorializing the agreement). 
 109. E-Mail from Author to Prof. Joseph Kakooza, Dean, Nkumba University Law School 
(Jan. 13, 2008) (on file with author) (memorializing the agreement). 
 110. See supra note 31; infra Part V. 
 111. See Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, 
Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 3 (1999); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON 
TRIAL (2000); Perlin, supra note 8; Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV. 373 
(1992). 
 112. See supra note 32. 
 113. Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of “Ordinary 
Common Sense,” Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 135 (1991). 
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cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and 
reinforces poor-quality lawyering, blasè judging, and, at times, 
perjurious and corrupt testifying.114 
In previous works, I have explored the relationships between 
sanism and pretextuality in matters involving, inter alia, competency 
to stand trial,115 sexual autonomy,116 the right to refuse treatment,117 
“autonomous decisionmaking,”118 and competency to plead guilty or 
waive counsel.119 I have begun to explore it specifically in the context 
of international human rights law.120 But, as I have discussed 
elsewhere, these factors can be more pernicious as they relate to 
lawyers’ representation of persons with mental disabilities in court 
proceedings. Writing about this latter topic four years ago, I alleged: 
Sanism permeates the legal representation process both in 
cases in which mental capacity is a central issue, and those in 
which such capacity is a collateral question. Sanist lawyers (1) 
distrust their mentally disabled clients, (2) trivialize their 
complaints, (3) fail to forge authentic attorney-client 
relationships with such clients and reject their clients’ potential 
contributions to case-strategizing, and (4) take less seriously 
case outcomes that are adverse to their clients.121 
 
 114. See generally PERLIN, supra note 111. 
 115. E.g., Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993); Michael L. Perlin, “Everything’s a Little Upside Down, As a 
Matter of Fact the Wheels Have Stopped”: The Fraudulence of the Incompetency Evaluation 
Process, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 239 (2004).  
 116. E.g., Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: 
Beyond the Last Frontier? 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517 (1994). 
 117. See, e.g., Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve 
Got,” supra note 12; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 94. 
 118. E.g., Perlin, supra note 8, at 722. 
 119. E.g., Perlin, supra note 49. 
 120. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 10, at 333; Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights 
and Comparative Mental Disability Law: The Role of Institutional Psychiatry in the 
Suppression of Political Dissent, 39 ISR. L. REV. 69, 89–91 (2006); PERLIN ET AL., supra note 
6, at 283–319. Other authors have begun to explore the dimensions of the same issue. See, e.g., 
Jennifer Fischer, A Comparative Look at the Right to Refuse Treatment for Involuntarily 
Hospitalized Persons with a Mental Illness, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 162–64 
(2006); David R. Katner, The Mental Health Paradigm and the MacArthur Study: Emerging 
Issues Challenging the Competence of Juveniles in Delinquency Systems, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 
503, 570–71 (2006). 
 121. Perlin, supra note 8, at 695. 
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Although there is a robust “psychiatric survivor” movement both 
in the United States and elsewhere,122 this voice is typically 
ignored.123 For at least twenty-five years, formerly hospitalized 
individuals and their supporters have performed an important role in 
the reform of the mental health system and in test case litigation. 
“Yet, there is little evidence that these groups are taken seriously 
either by lawyers or academics.”124  
 
 122. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, The Cognitive Politics of Professional Conflict: Law 
Reform, Mental Health Treatment Technology, and Citizen Governance, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
25, 57–58 n.132 (1992); Jennifer Honig & Susan Fendell, Meeting the Needs of Female Trauma 
Survivors: The Effectiveness of the Massachusetts Mental Health Managed Care System, 15 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 161, 185 (2000); Letters to the Editor, Taking Issue with Taking 
Issue: “Psychiatric Survivors” Reconsidered, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 601–05 (1997). 
 123.  But see Perlin, supra note 8, at 700 n.90: 
One important exception is Shin Imai, A Counter-Pedagogy for Social Justice: Core 
Skills for Community-based Lawyering, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 199 (2002) 
(discussing Osgoode Hall Law School’s clinic’s collaborative work with Parkdale 
Community Legal Services in representing one such group). See also Tewksbury v. 
Dowling, 169 F. Supp. 2d 103 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), and Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350 
(2d Cir. 2000) (litigants represented by Prof. William Brooks and the Mental 
Disability Law Clinic of Touro Law School). 
Id. at 700 n.90. Survivors, on the other hand, were an important voice in the drafting of the UN 
Convention. See, e.g., MindFreedom, News about the MFI Global Campaign Committee, 
http://www.mindfreedom.org/campaign/global/news-about-the-mfi-international-campaign-co
mmittee (last visited Sept. 16, 2008) (discussing role of MindFreedom in enabling “psychiatric 
survivors [to] enter the UN to participate in international negotiating sessions about the human 
rights of people labeled with disabilities”). For an early discussion of the role of such groups in 
the UN drafting process, see Theresia Degener, International Disability Law—A New Legal 
Subject on the Rise: The Interregional Experts’ Meeting in Hong Kong, December 13–17, 1999, 
18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 180, 189 n.38 (2000). 
 124. Perlin, supra note 8, at 699–700 (citations omitted). See also Michael L. Perlin, An 
Internet-Based Mental Disability Law Program: Implications for Social Change in Nations 
with Developing Economies, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 435, 444 n.39 (2007): 
[S]urvivor groups generally have opposed the constitutionality or application of 
involuntary civil commitment statutes, see, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 
960 (2d Cir. 1983), or supported the right of patients to refuse the involuntary 
administration of psychotropic drugs, see Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 838 (3d Cir. 
1981) (Alliance for the Liberation of Mental Patients, amicus curiae), but also have 
involved themselves in a far broader range of litigation. See, e.g., Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (impact of severe mental disability on Miranda waiver; 
Coalition for the Fundamental Rights and Equality of Ex-patients, amicus). The 
involvement of such groups in test case litigation—exercising the right of self-
determination in an effort to control, to the greatest extent possible, their own 
destinies,  see,  e.g.,  JUDI  CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN: PATIENT-CONTROLLED  
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In the civil commitment context, any sanism-inspired blunders by 
lawyers can easily be fatal to the client’s chance of success. If a 
lawyer rejects the notion that his client may be competent (indeed, if 
he engages in the not-atypical “presumption of incompetency” that is 
all to often de rigeur in these cases),125 the chances are far slimmer 
that he will advocate for such a client in the way that lawyers have 
been instructed—or, at the least, should be instructed—to advocate 
for their clients. In nations with no tradition of an “expanded due 
process model,”126 in cases involving persons subject to commitment 
to psychiatric institutions or those already institutionalized, a 
lawyer’s sanism can kill his client’s chance for release or for a 
judicial order mandating amelioration of conditions of confinement, 
or access to or freedom from treatment. 
CONCLUSION 
The legislative and judicial creation of rights—both positive and 
negative—is illusory unless there is a parallel mandate of counsel that 
is (1) free and (2) regularized and organized.127 Without the presence 
of such counsel, any rights articulated by a court, human rights 
commission, or legislature become merely “paper victories.”128 
 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (197[8])—is a major development 
that cannot be overlooked by participants in subsequent mental disability litigation. 
Id.  
 125.  Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment Law: 
Kendra’s Law as Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 183, 193 (2003) (“In short, the 
presumption in which courts have regularly engaged—that there is both a de facto and de jure 
presumption of incompetency to be applied to medication decision making—appears to be 
based on an empirical fallacy: psychiatric patients are not necessarily more incompetent than 
nonmentally ill persons to engage in independent medication decision making.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 126. See Michael L. Perlin, “Make Promises by the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and 
Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947, 971 (1997). 
 127. See generally PERLIN, supra note 6, at Chapter 2B. 
 128. Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is Good, You’ll Find out When 
You Reach the Top, You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and 
Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than “Idiot Wind?,” 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 246 
(2002) (“Mental disability law is strewn with examples of ‘paper victories,’ . . .” (quoting 
Michael Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD 
REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE 
MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie J. Bradley & Gary J. Clarke eds., 1976))). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/9
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Further, to be authentically effective, counsel needs to be available 
both for individual cases (in which commitment of the patient is 
being sought) and in “affirmative” cases (that is, cases consciously 
thought of as “public interest” or “law reform” cases in which 
persons with disabilities file suit as plaintiffs seeking variously to 
have courts articulate procedural or substantive due process rights in 
the commitment process,129 or to have courts articulate such rights 
with regard to conditions of confinement, the latter encompassing 
both positive rights, e.g., a right to treatment services,130 and negative 
rights, e.g., the right to refuse treatment).131 
An argument certainly can be made that the presence of sanism 
(which affects lawyers—even those active in the clinical 
movement132—and lay persons alike) and the technical complexity of 
involuntary civil commitment cases (involving, necessarily, expert 
testimony by mental health professionals and subtle predictions about 
“future dangerousness”)133 augment the necessity and importance of 
adequate representation in such cases. In arguing why the United 
States should ratify the new UN Convention, Tara Melish focused on 
the “deeply entrenched attitudes and stereotypes about disability that 
have rendered many of the most flagrant abuses of the rights of 
persons with disabilities ‘invisible’ from the mainstream human 
rights lens.”134 These stereotypes are the essence of sanism; vigorous, 
advocacy-focused counsel is needed to answer and rebut them. 
I believe that the creation and expansion of legal clinics into 
mental disability law is an important and necessary step in its 
evolution. The confluence of developments in international case law, 
the UN Convention publication, scholarly awareness, and the 
 
 129.  E.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that a statute 
that fails to provide a person alleged to be mentally ill with adequate procedural safeguards is 
unconstitutional). 
 130.  E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff’d sub. nom. Wyatt v. 
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the mentally ill have the constitutional 
right to adequate treatment in mental hospitals). 
 131. E.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that patients with mental 
illness committed involuntarily retain their constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs). 
 132. See Perlin, supra note 8. 
 133. See generally PERLIN, supra note 6, at Ch. 2A. 
 134. Tara Melish, The UN Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong Prospects, and 
Why the U.S. Should Ratify, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, 37, 44 (2007). 
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involvement of GAJE are all necessary steps toward a sensitive, 
comprehensive body of law. We must all do our part to ensure that 
defendants facing involuntary commitment have access to competent 
and adequate representation, in an effort to return to the Dylan lyric 
with which the Article’s title begins, to make it less likely that a 
patient’s “trial” is nothing more than, symbolically, his legal 
“funeral.” 
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